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ABSTRACT 
On the Impact of Forward Contract Obligations  
in Multi-Unit Auctions* 
Several regulatory authorities worldwide have recently imposed forward 
contract obligations on electricity producers as a way to mitigate their market 
power. In this paper we investigate how such contractual obligations affect 
equilibrium bidding in electricity markets, or in any other auction-based 
market. For this purpose, we introduce forward contracts in a uniform-price 
multi-unit auction model with complete information. We find that forward 
contracts are pro-competitive when allocated to relatively large and efficient 
firms; however, they might be anti-competitive otherwise. We also show that 
an increase in contract volume need not always be welfare improving. From a 
methodological point of view, we aim at contributing to the literature on multi-
unit auctions with discrete bids. 
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1 Introduction
Concerns over the exercise of market power in electricity markets have led several compe-
tition and regulatory authorities to impose forward contract obligations on the dominant
producers. Such contracts have taken various forms, but they all share one important fea-
ture: they commit producers to receiving a xed price for some fraction of their output before
wholesale market competition takes place. The vesting contractsintroduced at privatization
in the British electricity market (Wolfram (1999)) or the Competition Transition Costs for
stranded costs recovery in place in Spain from 1998 to 2006 (Fabra and Toro (2005)), pro-
vide two well-known examples. More recently, several European regulators are forcing large
electricity producers to auction-o¤ virtual power plants(VPPs), which essentially work as
forward sales. VPPs have been used as antitrust remedies in merger cases (e.g. EDF/EnBW,
DONG/Elsam/Energi 2 or E.ON/MOL), following antitrust proceedings (as in the Italian
AGCM case against ENEL), or in an attempt to dilute excessive market concentration (as
in Spain).1
In this paper we investigate how such contractual obligations - which we encompass under
the name of forward contracts - a¤ect equilibrium bidding behaviour in electricity markets, or
in any other auction-based market. Our purpose is two-fold. We seek to understand whether
forward contract obligations contribute to reducing prices and removing the ine¢ ciencies
due to market power. Related to this, we also seek to identifying the most e¤ective way to
allocate such obligations among (possibly) asymmetric rms.
There is already a large body of theoretical work on the impact of forward trading on the
performance of oligopolistic markets.2 In broad terms, the predictions of these papers are
based on a two-stage game in which (symmetric) rms choose their level of contract cover-
age prior to competing in the spot market. In the second stage, forward sales induce rms
to compete more ercely given that spot market prices only a¤ect their uncovered output.
This occurs regardless of whether rms compete by choosing quantities (as in Allaz and Vila
(1993) or Bushnell (2006)), prices (as in Mahenc and Salanié (2004)), or continuous supply
functions (as in Green (1999) or Newbery (1998)). However, once contracts are endogenized,
the predictions of these models tend to di¤er. For instance, whereas under Cournot com-
petition the subgame perfect equilibrium involves all rms selling forward contracts, under
Bertrand competition all rms buy their own production forward. Hence, prices decrease
1Market power concerns in electricity markets have also fostered the establishment and promotion of
forwards markets, as in the Pennsylvania-New Jersey-Maryland market (PJM) or in the Australian National
Electricity Market (Bushnell et al. (2007); Wolak (2000, 2007)). Furthermore, the default service auctions
used in several states of the US have implied an additional source of forward contracting for generators (Loxley
and Salant (2004)). However, these cannot be considered to be exogenous contract obligations, which is the
focus of this paper.
2There is also an extensive empirical literature that conrms that contracts a¤ect the performance of spot
markets. See Bushnell, Mansur and Saravia (2007), Fabra and Toro (2005), Hortacsu and Puller (2007),
Kühn and Machado (2006), Mansur (2007) or Wolak (2000, 2007).
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under Cournot competition but increase under Bertrand competition with respect to the
no-contracts case. Furthermore, even when rms compete à la Cournot, forward contracts
may turn out to be anti-competitive if there is an innite number of contract rounds before
the spot market opens. In particular, if rms are allowed to buy and sell contracts in all such
rounds, there arise multiple equilibrium outcomes among which only the monopoly outcome
is renegotiation-proof (Ferreira (2003)). Last, if rms interact for innitely many periods in
both the forward and spot markets, forward trading renders collusion more easily sustainable
(Liski and Montero (2006); Green and Le Coq (2006)).
Unfortunately, the above papers are not directly applicable to assessing the e¤ectiveness
of forward contract obligations in electricity markets. Firstly, forward contract obligations
are not endogenously chosen by rms but rather imposed by regulators. One could argue
that it would then su¢ ce to focus attention on the second stage of the games described above.
However, we believe that a more detailed modelling of the institutional and structural fea-
tures of electricity markets is necessary to ne-tune our predictions. Regarding institutional
features, it is unnecessary to resort to either the Cournot or the Bertrand assumptions be-
cause in each electricity spot market there is a set of written rules that determine how rms
compete. In particular, generators do not make a single price nor quantity choice but choose
a whole supply schedule made of a nite number of price-quantity pairs. An auctioneer then
dispatches the production units in increasing bid order until all demand is satised, and pays
all dispatched production at the highest accepted bid. Regarding structural features, it is
inadequate to assume perfect symmetry as it rarely holds in real markets. Since rmsca-
pacity and cost asymmetries have profound e¤ects on equilibrium market outcomes, ignoring
them would miss an important determinant of the link between forward contract obligations
and spot markets.
For these reasons, we have adopted the multi-unit auction approach(von der Fehr and
Harbord (1993) and García-Díaz and Marín (2003)).3 Consistently with actual electricity
market rules, it assumes that rms submit discrete supply functions to the pool.4 Further-
more, it allows to obtaining equilibrium predictions with no need to assume specic functional
forms, thus imposing no constraints on the degree of capacity and/or cost asymmetry among
rms. In sum, our approach aims at capturing essential institutional features of electricity
markets while providing enough exibility to reect complex market structures.
In line with the existing literature, we nd that forward contracts play a key role in
3Formally, we analyze a uniform-price multi-unit auction model in which quantity-bids are discrete, which
is a common feature of virtually all auctions in practice. In this respect, our paper belongs to a small set of
papers that analyze equilibrium behavior when bidders submit step bid functions (Kastl (2006); Kremer and
Nyborg (2004)).
4Actual market rules limit the number of bids that may be submitted by an individual rm to a nite
number. For example, in the original market design in England and Wales, generators were allowed to submit
up to three incremental prices per unit, while in Spain, rms are allowed to submit up to 25 price-quantity
pairs per generating unit.
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shaping equilibrium market outcomes. Furthermore, relaxing the symmetry assumption also
allows to uncovering new e¤ects. We show that forward contracts do not alter one intrinsic
prediction of the multi-unit auction approach: the fact that rms bid asymmetrically. More
specically, all rms but one (referred to as non-price-setters) behave as price-takers, while
the remaining rm (referred to as the price-setter) sets the price at the level that maximizes
its prots over the residual demand. Forward contracts have a distinct impact on rms
strategies depending on their identity as either price-setters or non-price-setters. On the
one hand, forward contracts reduce the price-setters prot-maximizing price because they
have the same e¤ect as an inward shift in its residual demand. On the other hand, forward
contracts have no impact on the non-price-settersbidding behaviour, as they continue to
behave as price-takers irrespective of whether they hold contracts or not. If taken in isolation,
these results would unambiguously indicate that forward contracts are pro-competitive.
However, assessing the impact of forward contracts on rms incentives alone is not
enough, as forward contracts also a¤ect equilibrium existence. If rms are fully symmet-
ric, equilibrium existence is not an issue. Hence, irrespective of who sets the price, an even
increase in all rmscontract positions leads to a monotonic reduction in spot market prices,
thus supporting the pro-competitive view of forward trading. However, when rms are asym-
metric, the existence of an equilibrium in which a highly contracted rm sets a low price is
not guaranteed, as one of the remaining rms may be better o¤ deviating to set a higher
price even at the expense of losing output. Hence, if only the high-price equilibria survive the
introduction of contracts, these may turn out to be anti-competitive despite reducing some
rmsincentives to raise prices.5
The extent to which contracts reduce (or increase) prices and improve (or worsen) welfare
depends on several factors. We nd that welfare depends non-monotonically on total contract
volume: whereas a small amount of contracts may improve market performance with respect
to the no-contracts case, a large amount of forward contracts may worsen it by destroying
the low-price equilibria or by leading to ine¢ ciently low prices. The distribution of forward
contracts across rms is also critical: forward contracts have the potential to improve mar-
ket performance only if they are allocated to rms with strong incentives to distort prices
(typically, the large and e¢ cient rms).
From a policy perspective, our analysis thus implies that forward contracts should be
allocated in ways that align all rms interests by (virtually) reducing their asymmetries.
Paradoxical though it may seem, it is as important to mitigate the large rmsincentives to
increase prices as it is to enhance those of the smaller competitors. This could be achieved
5Let us stress that the reasons underlying this result are unrelated to the potential anti-competitive e¤ects
of contracts when rms hold long-positions (as in Mahenc and Salanié (2004)). In our model, contracts may
have anti-competitive e¤ects even when rmspositions are short. We conjecture that this result is not unique
to our modelling approach, and that it would also arise in models that deliver multiple equilibria (such as the
Supply Function approach developed by Klemperer and Meyer (1989) and rst applied to electricity markets
by Green and Newbery (1992)) whenever rmsasymmetries are explicitly modelled.
4
by encouraging the intermediate to small rms in the industry to act as counterparts of the
contractual obligations imposed on the dominant producers. Thus, restricting certain rms
to enter into these contracts, as in the Spanish VPPs, is misplaced according to our model.
Regarding contract volume, forcing rms to hold too few or too many forward contracts
might be at best ine¤ective. Since the optimal contract volume ultimately depends on rms
cost structures and demand, it should be determined on a case-by-case basis.
Beyond the regulatory debate in electricity markets, this paper also aims at contributing
to the analysis of forward contracts and spot markets within more general settings. Aside
from the empirical and simulation studies, there are limited theoretical results on the impact
of forward contracts on heterogenous rms, a feature that is pervasive to most real-world
examples. Furthermore, besides electricity wholesale markets, there are several others in
which forward contracts and auctions coexist, or markets which are organized in ways that
make auction theory useful for understanding rmsstrategic behaviour (Klemperer (2003)).
The paper is structured as follows. In the next section we describe the ingredients of the
general model. In Section 3 we solve an illustrative example with the aim of presenting the
main results of the paper in a simple way. Section 4 is devoted to the analysis of the general
model. Section 5 investigates the impact of forward contracts on equilibrium outcomes,
which are further illustrated by means of a simulation exercise in Section 6. Last, Section 7
concludes with a summary of the main results and policy implications that can be derived
from the analysis. All proofs are contained in the Appendix.
2 Description of the Model
We consider a multi-unit uniform-price auction model in which N  2 rms compete for the
right to supply the market. Firm is productive capacity Ki; i = 1; :::; N; is made of several
units. Each unit has constant marginal costs of production up to the its capacity limit. By
stacking rm is units in increasing cost order, we construct its marginal cost curve, ci(q):6
We use Ci(q) to denote rm is cost function, i.e., Ci(q) =
R q
0
ci(x)dx.
Firms compete by submitting a nite number of price-quantity pairs to an auctioneer. In
particular, each rm submits one price per production unit specifying the minimum price at
which it is willing to supply the whole of the units capacity. Prices cannot exceed the market
reserve priceP , which is at least equal to the marginal costs of the most expensive unit, i.e.,
P  maxi ci (Ki). By stacking rmsprice-quantity pairs in increasing order, we construct
their bid functions, i.e., for rm i; bi(q) : [0; Ki]! [0; P ]. Accordingly, bid functions are left
continuous increasing step functions.
The auctioneer calls units to produce in increasing bid order, until total demand D(p);
with D0(p)  0; is fully satised. The market clearing price or equilibrium price, denoted
6We impose no constraints on the number of units rms have (other that it must be nite), and allow for
all types of asymmetries (both in size and cost) among the units owned by a rm, as well as across rms.
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p; is set equal to the bid of the last accepted unit(s). Therefore, all units with bids strictly
below p produce at capacity, whereas the unit(s) whose bid equals p will serve the residual
demand. If more than one unit has been bid in at p, we assume that the units with lower
marginal costs are called to produce rst; if their marginal costs are equal, we assume that
they split the residual demand equally.7 The quantity allocated to rm i is denoted by qi:
The production by all dispatched units is paid at the equilibrium price.
One last feature of the model is that rms are subject to forward contracts. We use  i
to denote rm is contract price, and xi  0 to denote rm is contract quantity;8 both  i
and xi are set before competition to supply the market takes place. Consequently, when the
equilibrium price is p; rm is prots are given by
i (p
) = pqi   Ci(qi) + [ i   p]xi; (1)
where the rst two terms give the rms spot market prots, and the last term gives the rms
contract prots. To x ideas, one can think of these contracts as being purely nancial, i.e.,
rm i continues to supply all its quantity qi to the market at p and the contracts counterpart,
e.g. a big customer, continues to buy all its demand from the market at p. The contract
requires rm i to pay (receive) the di¤erence between the contract price and the market price
times the contract quantity, [ i   p]xi; whenever positive (negative). Re-writing the above
expression as
i (p
) = p [qi   xi]  Ci(qi) +  ixi; (2)
clearly shows that if qi > xi rm i is a net-seller, whereas if qi < xi rm i is a net-buyer. The
term  ixi is xed when rms compete in the spot market; as such, it has no e¤ect on bidding
incentives.
Firm is problem is to choose a bid function that maximizes i given the bid functions
submitted by its rivals. All aspects of the model are common knowledge among bidders.
In the remainder of the paper we will label equilibrium outcomes as competitive or non-
competitive. An equilibrium outcome is said to be competitive if, irrespective of how rms
bid, the outcome (prices and quantities) is the same as if rms bid at marginal costs. The
competitive price and the competitive quantities are respectively denoted pc and fqc1; :::; qcNg.
All other equilibrium outcomes are referred to as non-competitive.
3 Illustrative Example
We start by analyzing a simple example in order to convey the intuitions of the main results
of the paper. In particular, we x N = 2 and assume that rm 1 and rm 2 own three
7This tie breaking rule is common in the literature, e.g. Fabra et al. (2006), among others.
8We adopt the convention that xi > 0 corresponds to rm i selling contracts (i.e., taking a short-position).
We do not allow rms to buy forwards since in real markets regulators impose sale obligations. However, in
our set-up forward sales and forward purchases simply have opposite e¤ects.
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production units each, with capacity normalized to one. Since each rm has to submit one
bid per production unit, rm i s bid function takes the following form,
bi (q) =
8><>:
bi1 if 0 < q  1
bi2 if 1 < q  2
bi3 if 2 < q  3
; i = 1; 2:
For expositional ease, in this example we will simply write bi = fbi1; bi2; bi3g to denote the
above bid function. Similarly, we will use B to denote the aggregate bid function that results
from ranking rmsunits in increasing bid order. Last, demand is assumed to be perfectly
inelastic at D = 3: To simplify notation, we assume w.l.o.g.  i = 0:
3.1 Symmetric rms
Let us start by analyzing the case in which rmscosts are symmetric. In particular, we
assume that the three units owned by each rm have marginal costs f0; 1; 2g.
We rst show that in the absence of contracts, the competitive outcome cannot be sus-
tained in equilibrium. Suppose that both rms bid at marginal costs, i.e., bi = f0; 1; 2g ;
i = 1; 2; so that the aggregate bid function is B = f0; 0; 1; 1; 2; 2g. Since the auctioneer has
to dispatch three units to satisfy demand, the competitive price is pc = 1 while the compet-
itive quantities are qci = 3=2 (i.e., each rm dispatches its rst unit and half of the second
one since in the event of a tie among units with equal marginal costs, demand is split equally
among them). Given that rms only make prots out of their rst unit, their prots at the
competitive outcome are ci = 1.
Suppose now that rm i deviates to bidding all its units at 2; b0i = f2; 2; 2g : The aggregate
bid function is B0 = f0; 1; 2; 2; 2; 2g ; the equilibrium price is set at p = 2 by rm is rst unit,
and rmsquantities are qi = 1 and qj = 2 (by the e¢ cient tie-breaking rule, rm is rst unit
is dispatched at capacity, as it has lower marginal costs than any of the other three units that
tie at 2). Since i = 2 > ci ; we have found a protable deviation. The competitive outcome
can thus not be sustained in equilibrium, unless rms used weakly-dominated strategies (e.g.
below marginal cost bidding), which we will rule out all throughout the paper.
Note that p = 2 is the price that maximizes rm is prots over its residual demand when
rm j bids at marginal costs: at any price p > 2; rm i makes no prots as all demand is
satised by rm j; at any price 1 < p < 2; rm i only dispatches its rst unit and thus makes
prots i = p < 2; at p = 1 rm i makes competitive prots ci = 1; and setting a price p < 1
is unprotable (and weakly-dominated) as it requires selling the second unit below marginal
costs. For given p = 2; rm j is also maximizing its prots by bidding at marginal costs,
as it is producing the maximum it can without incurring in losses. Furthermore, if rm i is
bidding all its units at 2; rm j can neither raise the price above p = 2 as rm i would then
satisfy all demand, nor reduce the price below p = 2 as it would require selling its third unit
below marginal costs.
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Therefore, the bid prole bi = f2; 2; 2g and bj = f0; 1; 2g constitutes an equilibrium.
By symmetry, there are two such equilibria which are both price-equivalent and only di¤er
in the identity of the rm setting the price at p = 2. Indeed, even when holding rms
identities xed, the same outcome can be sustained by many other bidding strategies, e.g.
by bi = f2; 2; 3g and bj = f1; 1; 2g : The only constraint put on the bids of rm js dispatched
units is that they must be low enough to discourage rm i from undercutting them. Similarly,
the bids of rm is undispatched units must be low enough to discourage rm j from raising
the price above p = 2. Accordingly, in what follows we will focus on equilibrium outcomes
rather than on bidding strategies.
Let us now introduce forward contracts. First, suppose xi 2 (1; 2) and xj = 0: If rm j
bids at marginal costs, rm is prot maximizing price now equals p = 1 rather than p = 2:
If, as in the no-contracts case, rm i sets the price at p = 2; it becomes a net-buyer with
xi > qi = 1. As such, it prefers to reduce the price to p = 1 by e.g. bidding at marginal
costs. Indeed, since marginal cost bidding allows rm 1 to save the price di¤erence over its
net-buying position, its prots increase by   [1  xi] > 0: Therefore, the equilibrium at which
rm i sets the price at p = 2 can no longer be sustained. On the contrary, the equilibrium at
which rm j sets the price at p = 2 can still be sustained: rm js incentives are unchanged,
while rm i does not nd it protable to reduce the price as at this equilibrium it is a net-
seller with xi < qi = 2: Therefore, contracts by one rm imply that the equilibrium at which
such a rm sets the price disappears. Whereas this is relevant from rmspoint of view - the
contracted rm now makes (weakly) higher prots as it produces more, - it is price-irrelevant
as the price at the surviving equilibrium remains the same. Therefore, forward contracts
have no impact on equilibrium prices.
In contrast, if xi = xj 2 (1; 2), forward contracts are pro-competitive in a strong sense:
the competitive outcome is the unique equilibrium outcome. Consider any bid prole at
which rm i is the price-setter and qi = 1 < xi and qj = 2 > xj. As rm i is a net-buyer, it
has incentives to reduce the price. However, if it reduces the price below its rivals bid, rm
i will then dispatch at least two units and thus will become a net-seller. This renders rm
is price-increase unprotable. The opposite occurs to rm j: as a net-seller it has incentives
to raise the price but if it does so it becomes a net-buyer. Alternatively, at any bid prole
such that both rms split demand equally qi = qj = 3=2; the equilibrium price must equal
p = pc = 1: Otherwise, each rm could increase its prots by bidding its second unit slightly
below (above) p if p > pc (if p < pc) in order to protably expand production (avoid
losses).
Last, if we let xi > 2 and assume that rm j bids at marginal costs, rm i is a net-buyer
regardless of p: Hence, its prot-maximizing price equals p = 0, which it can sustain by
bidding all its units a zero (bidding below marginal costs is not weakly-dominated in this
case precisely because rm i is a net-buyer). Regardless of whether rm j holds contracts or
not, rm j cannot increase its prots by deviating from marginal cost bidding given that the
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price cannot be further reduced nor increased. Hence, forward contracts may also give rise
to equilibria with ine¢ ciently low prices, i.e., below the competitive price.
3.2 Asymmetric rms
The symmetry assumption is crucial in some of the results derived so far. For instance, if
rmscosts are not symmetric, their prot maximizing prices at the no-contracts case might
as well di¤er. Accordingly, if contracts by rm i destroy the equilibrium at which rm i sets
the price, the e¤ect of introducing contracts might no longer be price-irrelevant, as it was
the case with symmetric rms and xi 2 (1; 2) > xj = 0:
To x ideas, we assume that rm 2s units have marginal costs f0; 1; 3g ; while the marginal
costs of rm 1s units remain unchanged. In the absence of contracts, there now exist two
equilibrium outcomes: (i) the same equilibrium outcome as in the example above, with rm
2 setting the price at p = 2; and (ii) a new equilibrium outcome with rm 1 setting the price
at p = 3 that can be supported by e.g. b1 = f3; 3; 3g and bj = f0; 1; 3g (note that rm 1 can
now raise the price up to p = 3 given that the marginal costs of rm 2s undispatched unit
equals 3). Since rmsprot-maximizing prices di¤er, it is no longer inconsequential whether
contracts are allocated to one rm or another.
Let us rst allocate all contracts to the e¢ cient rm, x1 2 (1; 2) > x2 = 0: In contrast
to the no-contracts case, the equilibrium with rm 1 setting the price at p = 3 can no
longer be sustained: as a net-buyer, rm 1 would rather bid at marginal costs in order to
reduce the price from p = 3 to p = 1. However, if rm 1 bids at marginal costs, rm 2 is
better-o¤ setting the price at p = 2. Since only the low-price equilibrium outcome survives
the introduction of contracts, contracts are pro-competitive.
Alternatively, let us now allocate all contracts to the ine¢ cient rm, x2 2 (1; 2) > x1 = 0:
For the same logic, the equilibrium with rm 2 setting the price at p = 2 disappears: as a
net-buyer, rm 2 would rather bid at marginal costs in order to reduce the price from p = 2
to p = 1. However, rm 1 would then respond by setting the price at p = 3, which implies
that only the high-price equilibrium outcome survives the introduction of contracts. Hence,
forward contracts are anti-competitive in this case.
For completeness, Table 1 provides equilibrium prices for all contract volumes when only
one rm is contracted.
To sum-up, this example illustrates that the impact of forward contracts on bidding in-
centives and equilibrium outcomes crucially depends on two key elements: their total volume
and their distribution across rms. It shows that contracts reduce rmsincentives to in-
crease prices. However, this does not necessarily lead to lower equilibrium prices as contracts
might also jeopardize the existence of the equilibria in which the contracted rm sets the
price. Indeed, contracts might lead to (weakly) higher prices whenever they are allocated in
su¢ ciently large quantity to the rm that already has the greatest incentives to set low prices
(in this example, the ine¢ cient rm). For similar reasons, an increase in contract volume
9
Equilibrium Prices
Firm 1 is contracted Firm 2 is contracted
xi 2 [0; 1) f3; 2g f3; 2g
xi 2 [1; 2] 2 3
xi 2 (2; 3] f0; 2g f3; 0g
Table 1: Equilibrium prices as a function of rmsforward contract positions when rm 1s
marginal costs are f0; 1; 2g ; rm 2s marginal costs are f0; 1; 3g ; and D = 3
might not necessarily be pro-competitive. Last, these e¤ects can only be uncovered once the
symmetry assumption is relaxed. Otherwise, contracts either have no impact on equilibrium
prices or they have an unambiguous pro-competitive e¤ect, as already highlighted in previous
papers.
4 Analysis of the Model
In this section, we characterize equilibrium outcomes (equilibrium prices and quantities) in
the general model. For this purpose, we rst note that at any equilibrium resulting in a
non-competitive outcome, rmsbidding behavior must be asymmetric.9 More specically,
to support any equilibrium outcome with a price p 6= pc; one rm must bid at p some unit
with marginal costs other than p, and this unit must be at least partially dispatched. We
refer to such rm as the price-setter. Furthermore, at a non-competitive equilibrium there
exists at least and at most one price-setter, so that all other rms must behave di¤erently.
We refer to such rms as the non-price-setters.
The intuition behind this distinct bidding behavior relies on the fact that rms submit a
nite number of price-quantity pairs, which implies that there is a positive output mass at the
margin.10 Price-competition to supply this positive mass ensures that in any non-competitive
equilibrium there is a single price-setter. To see this, argue by contradiction and suppose
that there is more than one price-setter. Assume rst that p > pc; so that at least one of
the price-setters produces less than its competitive quantity. This could never be part of an
equilibrium given that the price-setter that is selling less than its competitive quantity could
expand its production by undercutting the other price-setter(s). Since there is a positive mass
9Previous papers have already predicted asymmetric bidding behaviour (García-Díaz and Marín (2003),
Fabra et al. (2006), and Crawford et al. (2007) among others). We note here that contracts do not alter this
intrinsic feature of the model. Further note that if the equilibrium outcome is competitive, all rms trivially
act as price-takers. Hence, such asymmetries do not arise.
10Competition for the margin is also the driving force for the no-underpricing equilibrium in the multi-unit
Treasury auctions analyzed by Kremer and Nyborg (2004). If one assumes smooth supply functions, as in
Newbery (1998) and Green (1999), there is no mass at the margin and such asymmetries in rmsbidding
behavior do not arise.
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at the margin, the increase in the deviants output outweighs the innitesimal (if any) price
reduction caused by its deviation. A similar reasoning applies to the case in which p < pc: In
particular, if there is more than one price-setter, one of them must be producing more than
its competitive quantity. However, given that it could avoid production losses by bidding
above p; this can never be part of an equilibrium. Last, at any equilibrium resulting in a
non-competitive outcome there must be at least one price-setter. Otherwise, if all marginal
units were bid in at marginal costs, the equilibrium price p would trivially be equal to the
competitive price pc.
Accordingly, in what follows we rst x the identity of the price-setter and non-price-
setters in order to characterize rmsoptimal bidding behaviour conditional on their identi-
ties. We then characterize equilibrium outcomes by stating the conditions under which no
rm prefers to reverse its identity given its rivalsbidding behavior. We end this section by
discussing existence and multiplicity of equilibrium outcomes.
All through the paper we will rene the equilibrium set by restricting attention to strate-
gies that are not weakly-dominated. Weak-dominance arguments eliminate below marginal
cost bidding for quantities above the rms contract cover, above marginal cost bidding for
quantities below the rms contract cover, and bidding units out of marginal cost order (see
Lemma A.1 in the Appendix).
4.1 Equilibrium behavior by the non-price-setters
Let rm i be the price-setter at p. We rst show that all other rms j 6= i behave as
price-takers. Namely, they nd it optimal to bid all their units at marginal costs, or at bids
that yield the same outcome as marginal cost bidding. This result holds true regardless of
whether rms hold contracts or not.
Proposition 1 At any Nash equilibrium in which rm i is the price-setter, all other rms
produce the same output as if they bid at marginal costs.
The intuition underlying the above result is simple. Suppose that one of rm js units
with marginal costs strictly below the equilibrium price, p; has not been called to produce.
That could never be part of an equilibrium since rm j could always achieve a positive
increment in output by bidding such a unit slightly below p: Such a deviation may or may
not a¤ect the equilibrium price, but even if it does, the quantity e¤ect always outweighs the
price e¤ect as the price reduction can be made arbitrarily small. Alternatively, suppose that
one of rm js units with marginal costs strictly above p has been called to produce. Again,
that could never be part of an equilibrium since rm j could avoid losses by bidding such a
unit slightly above p; with only (if any) an innitesimal increase in the price. These results
are valid independently of whether the rm is a net-seller or a net-buyer precisely because
the price e¤ect on the rms net position is almost nil.
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Proposition 1 implies that, in equilibrium, all units belonging to rms j with marginal
costs below the equilibrium price p are dispatched at capacity, whereas all units belonging to
rms j with marginal costs above p are not dispatched at all. Given the e¢ cient tie-breaking
rule, the issue of whether the non-price-setters dispatch units with marginal costs equal to p
depends on whether p is above or below the competitive price, pc: If p is above (below) pc,
the price-setter is producing less (more) than its competitive quantity; as this implies that
price-setters marginal unit has marginal costs below (above) p; the marginal output will be
allocated to the price-setter (non-price-setters). This allows to specify the output produced
by the non-price-setters in equilibrium as a function of the equilibrium price p:
Corollary 1 At any equilibrium in which rm i is the price-setter and p is the equilibrium
price, the quantity produced by rm j 6= i is non-decreasing in p and it satises
qNPSj (p
) =
8><>:
max fq : cj(q)  pg if p < pc;
qcj if p
 = pc;
max fq : cj(q) < pg if p > pc:
Note that to guarantee that non-price-setters produce qNPSj (p
) ; they do not need to
bid at marginal costs as there are many other outcome equivalent strategies. However, their
choice of bidding strategies is not inconsequential, since these will determine the shape of the
residual demand faced by the price-setter and hence its optimal bidding behavior.
Proposition 1 also implies that, conditionally on the identity of the price-setter, we can
write the non-price-settersprots as a function of the equilibrium price p: Consider a candi-
date equilibrium at which rm i is the price-setter at p. Equilibrium prots for the remaining
rms j, j 6= i; are given by,
NPSj (p
) = max
q2[0;D(p))
fp [q   xj]  Cj (q)g+  jxj:
The following Lemma derives properties of the non-price-settersprot function.
Lemma 1 Let p be the equilibrium price.
(i) If p  pc; then NPSj (p) is an increasing (non-decreasing) function of p for all j
such that xj < qcj (xj = q
c
j):
(ii) If p  pc; then NPSj (p) is a decreasing (non-increasing) function of p for all j
such that xj > qcj (xj = q
c
j):
Trivially, the prots made by a rm are increasing (decreasing) in p if such a rm is a
net-seller (net-buyer). However, since a rms net position is in itself an endogenous outcome,
we can not state in general whether a non-price-setters prots are increasing or decreasing
in the equilibrium price. Still, we can be sure that if xj < qcj rm j will be better o¤ when
p is raised above pc since p  pc implies qcj  qNPSj (p), which in turn guarantees that rm
j is a net-seller. The reverse is true if xj > qcj :
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4.2 Equilibrium behavior by the price-setter
The price-setters problem is simply to choose the price that maximizes its prots over the
residual demand induced by its rivalsbidding behavior, i.e., total demand minus the quantity
that the other rms are willing to supply at lower prices. Formally, the price-setter must
choose
pi (b i) 2 argmax
p
PSi (p; b i) ;
where
PSi (p; b i) = p [qi (p; b i)  xi]  C (qi (p; b i)) +  ixi;
and,
qi (p; b i) = max
(
0; D (p) 
X
j 6=i
qj(p; b j)
)
:
Furthermore, at the equilibrium price, optimal behavior by the non-price-setters (i.e., con-
sistent with Proposition 1) implies that the price-setter sells
qPSi (p
) = D (p) 
X
j 6=i
qNPSj (p
); 11
and makes prots
PSi (p
) = max
p

p

qPSi (p)  xi
  Ci  qPSi (p)	+  ixi
Since both the cost function and the residual demand are step-functions, the price-setters
prot function may fail to be di¤erentiable, so that the price-setters prot-maximizing price
might not be obtained as the solution to a rst order condition.
Thus, in order to understand the price-setters bidding incentives, let us work directly
with changes in rm is prots when it raises the price from p to some p0 > p,
i (p
0; b i)  i (p; b i) = [p0   p] [qi (p0; b i)  xi] 
Z qi(p;b i)
qi(p0;b i)
[p  ci (q)] dq: (3)
As in any standard monopoly problem, the price increase implies greater revenues through
the rms net position - the rst term in (3), - but it also implies a prot loss due to the
output reduction - the second term in (3). Accordingly, the price-setters incentives to raise
the price are stronger the bigger its net position is, the less elastic its residual demand is
and the smaller the price-cost margin on its lost production is. It then follows that rm is
prot-maximizing price given its rivalsstrategies, pi (b i) ; is non-increasing in its contract
cover xi: This mimics the standard result that smaller rms (here, rms with smaller net
positions) have weaker incentives to raise the price.12
11For prices other than p this condition may not hold since the non-price-setters need not be bidding at
marginal costs.
12Discreteness in the bidding functions is the reason why the prot-maximizing price is not strictly de-
creasing in the contract quantity. Indeed, Newbery (1998) nds that prices are strictly decreasing in contract
cover when rmsbidding functions are continuous.
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Inspection of (3) further shows that it is never optimal for a price-setter that holds fewer
contracts than its competitive quantity, xi < qci ; to set a price below the competitive one,
p < pc. To see this, note that rm i could marginally increase the price above p and still
remain a net-seller. This would allow the rm to earn more through its positive net-position
- the rst term in (3), - while saving the margin between the price and its marginal costs,
which is negative for prices below the competitive one - the second term in (3). However,
despite the fact that p  pc, the price-setter remains a net-seller in equilibrium. Intuitively,
if rm i were a net-buyer in equilibrium, it could always increase its prots by marginally
reducing the price. The reversed arguments apply for the case in which the price-setter holds
more contracts than its competitive quantity, xi > qci .
Proposition 2 In an equilibrium in which rm i is the price-setter, (i) if xi < qci ; then
p  pc and xi  qi; (ii) if xi = qci ; then p = pc and xi = qi; and (iii) if xi > qci ; then p  pc
and xi  qi:
Proposition 2 thus relates the primitives of the model (contract quantities and rmscosts,
which determine rmscompetitive quantities) to the equilibrium outcome. In particular, it
allows to predict whether the price-setter will raise or reduce the equilibrium price above or
below the competitive one, and whether it will be a net-seller or a net-buyer in equilibrium.
To conclude, let us compare the prots made by the price-setter and the non-price-setters
in equilibrium. Given that the price-setter behaves as a monopolist over the residual demand,
one may be tempted to (wrongly) believe that the price-setters role is an appealing one, when
just the opposite is true.
Lemma 2 PSi (p
)  NPSi (p) for any equilibrium price p:
As stated in the previous Lemma, for any equilibrium price p, the price-setters prots
are bounded above by the prots it could obtain as a non-price-setter. Both the price-setter
and the non-price-setters are paid the same price. However, unlike the non-price-setters, the
price-setter either sells less (when p > pc) than if it behaved as a price-taker, in which case
it gives up a positive prot margin on its reduced production, or it produces more (when
p < pc), in which case it must be incurring in productive losses.
Since we have already characterized rmsoptimal behaviour conditional on their iden-
tities, we are now ready to characterize the equilibria of the game. This requires to assess
whether the price-setter prefers to become a non-price-setter and vice-versa, an issue which
we analyze next.
4.3 Equilibrium characterization
An equilibrium outcome will be a collection of quantities produced by the non-price-setters
and a price chosen by the price-setter such that no rm wants to deviate neither by changing
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its quantity or price choice, nor by changing its identity. The following Theorem provides
necessary and su¢ cient conditions for equilibrium bidding.
Theorem 1
(i) A strategy prole constitutes a Nash equilibrium in which rm i sets the price at p  pc
if and only if the following three conditions hold:
1). p = pi (b i) and qj = q
NPS
j (p
) for all j 6= i;
2). PSi (p
)  NPSi (p) for all p < p such that qNPSi (p) +
P
j 6=i qj(p; b) = D(p); and
3). NPSj (p
)  PSj (pj) for all j 6= i such that either pj (b j) > p and xj < qj
 
pj ; b j

hold or pj (b j) < p
 and xj > qj
 
pj ; b j

hold.
(ii) A strategy prole constitutes a Nash equilibrium in which rm i sets the price at
p  pc if and only if the following three conditions hold:
1). p = pi (b i) and qj = q
NPS
j (p
) for all j 6= i;
2). PSi (p
)  NPSi (p) for all p > p such that qNPSi (p) +
P
j 6=i qj(p; b) = D(p); and
3). NPSj (p
)  PSj (pj) for all j 6= i such that either pj (b j) < p and xj > qj
 
pj ; b j

hold or pj (b j) > p
 and xj < qj
 
pj ; b j

hold.
Consider part (i) of Theorem 1 - part (ii) follows the reversed arguments. In equilibrium,
one rm sets the price that maximizes its prots over the residual demand, p = pi (b i), and
all other rms behave as price-takers given p (Proposition 1). Since all rms are already
optimizing conditionally on their identities, the only relevant deviations are those by which
the price-setter becomes a non-price-setter and viceversa. If the price-setter became a non-
price-setter, it would do so in order to increase its production, implying that the only relevant
deviations by the price-setter are those that involve a price reduction. Furthermore, for the
non-price-setters, it is never protable to deviate by setting the price at its prot maximizing
price if this results in a reversal of its net-position.
To see this, consider a non-price-setter that is a net-seller at the candidate equilibrium.
Suppose rst that its prot-maximizing price as a price-setter is below the equilibrium price.
If such a rm deviated to become the price-setter, it would receive less for its net-sales and it
would have to incur in productive losses on its increased production, rendering its deviation
unprotable. Suppose instead that its prot-maximizing price as a price-setter is above the
equilibrium price. Inspection of equation (3) again shows that it cannot be protable for
such a rm to deviate if it became a net-buyer after the price increase, as both terms in the
equation would be negative. Hence, we need not impose any additional condition on this
subset of rms - other than behaving optimally as non-price-setters - given that they cannot
protably become the price-setter. The reversed arguments show that the only relevant
deviations by the net-buyers involve a price reduction, which is unprotable whenever it
forces the deviant to become a net-seller.
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4.4 Equilibrium existence and multiplicity
We now analyze whether equilibrium existence is guaranteed, and whether there is multiplic-
ity of bid function equilibria and/or multiplicity of equilibrium outcomes. For this purpose,
it is useful to distinguish between two cases: (i) the polar cases, in which all rmsare either
net-sellers or net-buyers at the competitive outcome (i.e., either xi  qci or xi  qci for all
rms), and (ii) the mixed cases in which at least two rmsnet positions have opposite signs.
The polar cases are the empirically relevant ones (in practice, rms rarely hold that many
contracts so as to exceed their competitive quantities), but we will also cover the mixed cases
for completeness.
4.4.1 Polar cases
Under the polar cases, all rms agree as to whether the equilibrium price should be set
above or below the competitive one (Proposition 2). This has important implications for
equilibrium behavior. In particular, there is always an equilibrium in which the non-price-
setters bid at marginal costs. Furthermore, conditionally on the identity of the price-setter,
any other equilibrium is outcome equivalent to the equilibrium at which the non-price-setters
bid at marginal costs.
Proposition 3 Index rms by their prot-maximizing prices when rivals bid at marginal
costs, i.e., pi (c i)  pi+1 (c i+1).
(i) If xi  qci for all rms, there exists a pure-strategy equilibrium in which rm i sets the
price at p = pi (c i)  pc while rms j 6= i sell qj = qNPSj (p) if and only if NPSj (p) 
PSj
 
pj

for all rms j such that pj (c j) > p
.
(ii) If xi  qci for all rms, there exists a pure-strategy equilibrium in which rm i sets
the price at p = pi (c i)  pc while rms j 6= i sell qj = qNPSj (p) if and only if NPSj (p) 
PSj
 
pj

for all rms j such that pj (c j) < p
.
Consider part (i) of the Proposition above. By Proposition 2, xi  qci implies p  pc:
Furthermore, since all rms j 6= i are price-takers, it follows that all rms in equilibrium
are net-sellers. Accordingly, the only relevant deviations are those of the non-price-setters
whose prot-maximizing price is above the equilibrium price: becoming a price-setter at a
lower price cannot be protable as the deviant would produce less, and it would sell its
positive net position at a lower price. The price-setter cannot protably deviate: on the
one hand, it is already optimizing given its identity; on the other hand, if it became a non-
price-setter, the resulting price would be the competitive price, which cannot be protable
by revealed preference. Similarly, when all rms are net-buyers in equilibrium, as in part
(ii) of Proposition 3, the only relevant deviations are those of the non-price-setters with a
prot-maximizing price below the equilibrium price, as raising the price is unprotable.
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The above implies that equilibrium existence is guaranteed under both cases.13 If xi  qci
for all rms, no rm would like to deviate from the highest price equilibrium; if xi  qci for
all rms, no rm would like to deviate from the lowest price equilibrium.
Corollary 2 Index rms by their prot-maximizing prices when rivals bid at marginal costs,
i.e., pi (c i)  pi+1 (c i+1).
(i) If xi  qci for all rms, the equilibrium in which rm 1 sets the price always exists.
(ii) If xi  qci for all rms, the equilibrium in which rm N sets the price always exists.
For a given price-setter, there exist multiple bid function proles that constitute an equi-
librium (all those satisfying Theorem 1). This derives from the fact that rms only care
about one point in their bid functions, the one corresponding to the market clearing price.
Furthermore, the price that maximizes the price-setters prots depends on the bid functions
submitted by the non-price-setters, thus paving the way for this multiplicity of equilibrium
bid functions to also generate multiplicity in equilibrium outcomes. Fortunately, this is not
the case: for a given price-setter, all the equilibria result in the same market price and output
allocation across rms.14
Proposition 4 Suppose that either xi  qci or xi  qci for all rms. Conditionally on the
identity of the price-setter, all the equilibria are outcome equivalent.
Consider the case in which all rms are net-sellers at the competitive outcome, and assume
that there exists an equilibrium in which all the non-price-setters bid at marginal costs and
the price-setter, rm i, bids all its units at its prot-maximizing price.15 Proposition 4 above
guarantees that there cannot exist any other equilibrium in which rm i is the price-setter that
results in a di¤erent equilibrium outcome. If in equilibrium one of the non-price-setters bids
above marginal costs and this results in a di¤erent equilibrium price, such a non-price-setter
would be producing less than under marginal cost bidding, thereby contradicting Proposition
1. Instead, if one of the non-price-setters bids some units below marginal costs, the resulting
equilibrium outcome must remain unchanged by revealed preference arguments. Last, if the
price-setter uses a di¤erent bid function, it should also result in the same market price and
lead (by Proposition 1) to the same output allocation as the original equilibrium. When all
rms are net-buyers, the reverse arguments apply.
Finally, a di¤erent source of multiplicity of equilibrium outcomes may arise due to the
coexistence of several equilibria which di¤er in the identity of the price-setter. This (potential)
13In contrast, in Kastl (2006)s model, incomplete information implies that "existence of an equilibrium in
a model of uniform-price auction with restricted space is an open question."
14In contrast, multiplicity of equilibrium outcomes is pervasive in auctions with continuous bid functions
(see Back and Zender (1993), Klemperer and Meyer (1989) and Wilson (1979)).
15More specically, we assume that the price-setter bids all units at pi except for those units for which
bidding at pi is weakly dominated, in which case they are bid in at marginal costs.
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multiplicity was highlighted in the illustrative example provided in Section 3 but it holds more
generally, as shown next.
Corollary 3 Index rms by their prot-maximizing prices as price-setters when their rivals
bid at marginal costs, i.e., pi (c i)  pi+1 (c i+1) :
(i) Suppose that xi  qci for all rms i = 1; :::; N: If the equilibrium in which rm k is
the price-setter exists, the equilibria in which rms i < k are the price-setters also exist.
Alternatively, if it does not exist, the equilibria in which rms i > k are the price-setters do
not exist either, k = 2; :::; N:
(ii) Suppose that xi  qci for all rms i = 1; :::; N: If the equilibrium in which rm k
is the price-setter exists, the equilibria in which rms i > k are the price-setters also exist.
Alternatively, if it does not exist, the equilibria in which rms i < k are the price-setters do
not exist either, k = 1; :::; N   1:
In the case in which all rms are net-sellers (net-buyers) at the competitive outcome,
existence of a candidate equilibrium implies that all other candidate equilibria with higher
(lower) equilibrium prices also exist. To understand this result, note that the prots that a
rm achieves as a price-setter are given, but the prots it makes as a non-price-setter are
increasing (decreasing) in the equilibrium price (Lemma 1). Hence, if none of the rms has
incentives to deviate from a candidate equilibrium, it must also be the case that none of
them wants to deviate from a candidate equilibrium with a higher (lower) price. For similar
reasons, if a candidate equilibrium does not exist, any other candidate equilibrium with lower
(higher) prices does not exist either.
4.4.2 Mixed cases
Consider now the mixed cases, in which some rms hold fewer contracts than their compet-
itive quantities while others hold more. Similar results regarding equilibrium existence and
multiplicity as those found under the polar cases also arise under the mixed cases as long as in
equilibrium all rms are either net-sellers or net-buyers. The intuition is simple: if all rms
net position at the candidate equilibrium have the same sign, none of the non-price-setters
would like to deviate in order to increase or reduce the price.
Under the remaining cases, net-sellers and net-buyers have conicting interests concerning
the level of the equilibrium price. An over-contracted rm would set a price below marginal
costs, whereas an under-contracted rm would set a price above. This conict of interests
has profound e¤ects on equilibrium behavior. In particular, and in contrast with the polar
cases, the non-price-setterschoice of bidding strategies is not inconsequential as it a¤ects
both equilibrium existence as well as the multiplicity of equilibrium outcomes.
Furthermore, equilibria in which the non-price-setters bid at marginal costs may fail to
exist as marginal cost bidding exacerbates the aforementioned conict of interests. To see
this, note that marginal cost bidding makes it easier for an over-contracted rm to set a low
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price, as it reduces the number of units that it has to bid below marginal costs in order to
drive the market price below the competitive one. Since rms with fewer contracts may nd
it protable to set a much higher price, an equilibrium may fail to exist. However, if one
allows the non-price-setters to follow any (undominated) strategy, equilibrium existence is
guaranteed, as shown next.
Proposition 5 Under the mixed cases, an equilibrium always exists. However, in this equi-
librium the non-price-setters may not be bidding at marginal costs.
The e¤ect of enlarging the set of the non-price-settersbidding strategies is not only to
restore equilibrium existence. In contrast to the polar cases (Proposition 4), it also implies
that there may arise multiple equilibrium outcomes even when the identity of the price-setter
is xed. To see this, consider a duopoly game in which demand is inelastic. Firm 1 has no
contracts whereas rm 2s contracts do not exceed total demand,16 and p1 (c2) > p
c > p2 (c1) :
To make the analysis interesting, suppose that at p1 (c2) rm 2 is a net-buyer. By Theorem
1, it is then an equilibrium for rm 1 to bid all its units at p1 (c2) and for rm 2 to bid them
at marginal costs given that: 1) both rms are optimizing conditional on their identities; 2)
if rm 1 became the non-price-setter the price would be driven down to pc; which by revealed
preference is unprotable; and 3) if rm 2 became the price-setter and reduced the price, it
would face total demand and hence become a net-seller, which would render the deviation
unprotable.
However, it is also an equilibrium for rm 2 to bid at zero up to its contract quantity and
to bid its remaining units at marginal costs. The best response by rm 1 is then to set a
price above c2(x2); given that at any lower price rm 1s residual demand is constant. Note
that at the new candidate equilibrium rm 2 would be a net-seller, and that the new price
would exceed p1 (c2) given that at p

1 (c2) rm 2 was a net-buyer. No rm has incentives to
deviate from this equilibrium given that: 1) both rms are optimizing conditional on their
identities; 2) if rm 1 became the non-price-setter the price would be driven down to zero;
and 3) rm 2 is a net-seller and hence does not nd it protable to reduce the price.
The two equilibria described above are not outcome equivalent despite the fact that rm
1 is the price-setter under both of them. Furthermore, one cannot derive a general Pareto
ranking among them: by revealed preference, the price-setter is strictly better-o¤ at the
equilibrium in which the non-price-setter bids at marginal costs; however, the non-price-
setter might be worse-o¤ or better-o¤ depending on the value of x2:
To conclude, under the polar cases (i) equilibrium existence is always guaranteed and, (ii)
conditionally on the identity of the price-setter, the equilibrium outcome is unique. Hence,
any potential multiplicity of equilibrium outcomes must derive from the coexistence of equi-
libria in which di¤erent rms act as price-setters. These results may not hold in some mixed
cases.
16More precisely let us assume that D > x2  x2; where x2 (formally dened in the Appendix).is the
maximum quantity whose marginal costs do not exceed c2 (x2) :
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5 The Impact of Forward Contracts
We now analyze the impact of forward contracts on equilibrium outcomes under two alter-
native specications: a symmetric oligopoly and an asymmetric duopoly. This allows to
assessing the relationship between rmsasymmetries and the e¤ects of forward contracts,
an issue which, as far as we are aware of, has not been studied elsewhere.
5.1 Symmetric rms
First, assume that rms are symmetric in all respects (including their contract quantities),
and consider the e¤ects of increasing their contract coverage on prices and productive e¢ -
ciency.17
Lemma 3 Assume there exist N symmetric rms. If contracts are symmetrically distributed
among them, i.e., x1 = ::: = xN = x;
(i) equilibrium prices are non-increasing in x; and
(ii) productive e¢ ciency is non-decreasing in x for x  qc; and non-increasing in x for
x  qc:
Since rms are fully symmetric, there exist N equilibrium outcomes that only di¤er in
the identity of the price-setter. As rms contract coverage is increased, the equilibrium
price is reduced from the level that results at the no-contracts case to the competitive price,
when all rms are fully contracted. Hence, up to the competitive quantity, contracts unam-
biguously contribute to reduce prices and improve productive e¢ ciency. However, as total
contract coverage is further increased, rms start exercising monopsony power, leading to
prices below the competitive price. Furthermore, since the price-setter produces more than
at the competitive outcome, productive ine¢ ciencies re-emerge. Hence, contracts have the
potential of being welfare improving, but they may also reduce it if held in su¢ ciently large
quantities.
For given contracts, similar results also arise in Allaz and Vila (1993)s and Bushnell
(2007)s Cournot models, as well as in Newbery (1998)s Supply Function Equilibrium model.
Our contribution here is to show that these results are robust to the introduction of a di¤erent
mode of competition provided that rms are fully symmetric.
5.2 Asymmetric rms
We now focus on a duopoly case while allowing for all types of asymmetries among rms. In
order to guarantee equilibrium existence and uniqueness of equilibrium outcomes, we shall
assume that rms hold contracts that never exceed their competitive quantities. Also, this
17The symmetry assumption guarantees that we are always under the polar cases, implying that both
equilibrium existence and uniqueness of equilibrium outcomes are guaranteed.
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assumption implies that any potential ine¢ ciency cannot be explained by rms holding an
excessive amount of contracts, as in point (ii) of Lemma 3 above. Similarly, in order to
isolate the distinct e¤ects of contracting by each rm, we shall assume that only one rm is
contracted at a time. These assumptions make the analysis clearer without biasing its main
conclusions.
The following Proposition summarizes the e¤ects of contracts on equilibrium prices.
Proposition 6 Assume that there exist N = 2 (possibly) asymmetric rms, indexed by their
prot-maximizing prices when rivals bid at marginal costs at the no-contracts case, p1 (c1) 
p2 (c2) > p
c:
(i) As compared to the no-contracts case, contracts by rm 1 lead to (weakly) lower prices.
In contrast, there exists 0  x02 < qc2 such that contracts by rm 2 lead to (weakly) lower prices
if x2 2 (0; x02) ; or to (weakly) higher prices if x2 2 [x02; qc2].
(ii) There exists a (weak) non-monotonic relationship between contract volume and equi-
librium prices regardless of whether contracts are allocated to rm 1 or rm 2.
Point (i) of Proposition 6 compares equilibrium prices with and without contracts, con-
ditioning on the identity of the contracted rm. If all contracts are allocated to the rm
with the high prot-maximizing price, contracts (weakly) reduce prices with respect to the
no-contracts case. This occurs regardless of whether the equilibrium in which the contracted
rm sets the price exists or not, as when it does not, the price will be set by the uncontracted
rm, which has the low prot-maximizing price.
This conclusion might be reversed when all contracts are allocated to the rm with the low
prot-maximizing price. Whereas it is still true that contracts (weakly) reduce prices when
both equilibria exist (for x2 < x02), this is no longer the case when the equilibrium in which
the contracted rm sets the price does not exist (for x2  x02). Given that the equilibrium
price will then be set by the uncontracted rm, which has the high prot-maximizing price,
contracts in this case may result in (weakly) higher prices as compared to the no-contracts
case.
Point (ii) of Proposition 6 assesses the desirability of increasing contract volume. It shows
that, irrespective of whether contracts are allocated to one rm or another, an increase in
contract volume does not always lead to price reductions. Indeed, an increase in contract
volume may lead to (weakly) higher prices whenever such an increase in contracts destroys
the equilibrium in which the contracted rm sets the price.
To sum up, our analysis highlights two key factors as determinants of whether contracts
are pro-competitive or anti-competitive: the allocation of contracts across rms as well as
their total volume. The analysis shows that contracts have anti-competitive e¤ects when
allocated to rms which, even in the absence of contracts, have weak incentives to raise
prices (i.e., the rms with low prot-maximizing prices, which are typically the small and/or
the ine¢ cient ones). However, contracts may be pro-competitive and lead to lower prices
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when allocated to rms which would otherwise have strong incentives to raise prices (i.e.,
typically the large and/or the e¢ cient ones). Furthermore, we have found that more is not
always better. That is, even when contracts are allocated to the rm with greatest incentives
to distort prices, an increase in its contract cover might lead to higher prices. As a corollary,
contracts should be allocated to rms with strong incentives to raise prices, and contract
quantities should not be neither too smallnor too large. As the optimal contract volume
ultimately depends on rmscost structures and demand, it has to be determined on a case
by case basis.
6 Simulating the Impact of Forward Contracts
We next apply the theoretical model to simulate equilibrium bidding behaviour and market
outcomes in the Spanish electricity market during 2005. The aim is to illustrate with real data
the strategic e¤ects of contracts that we have described in the previous section. Appendix
B contains details on the Spanish electricity market as well as on the procedures we have
followed to compute rmsmarginal costs.
We have considered alternative scenarios regarding total contract volume and its dis-
tribution across rms. In particular, under the assumption that only the two main rms
(Endesa and Iberdrola) behave strategically, we have computed both the competitive as well
as the equilibrium market outcomes under the no-contracts case and the cases in which either
Endesa (END) or Iberdrola (IB) hold contracts, ranging from 1,000 to 8,000 MWs.18
Table 2 reports the markups that result from comparing the simulated equilibrium price to
the price that would arise in a competitive market (Borenstein et al. ( 2002)).19 Markups are
computed at four demand levels (expressed in percentiles), under the no-contracts case and
under the cases in which Endesa has contracted either 2,000 or 5,000 MWs, and Iberdrola has
contracted either 6,000 or 8,000 MWs (results for all other cases are qualitatively similar).20
By comparing the markups across rms at the no-contracts case, we can readily verify that
Endesas prot-maximizing price exceeds that of Iberdrolas for all demand levels considered.
Let us rst consider the e¤ects of contracts when allocated to the rm with the high prot-
maximizing price, Endesa. First, contracts may reduce Endesas prot-maximizing price as
18Since the simulations are conducted on an hourly basis over a year, there are at least 8,760 and at most
(if both rms act as price-setters) 17,520 equilibrium market outcomes under each of the 17 cases considered,
plus the 8,760 competitive outcomes (these are the same regardless of whether rms hold contracts or not)-
summing over 300,000 simulated market outcomes in total. Simulations have been produced by ENERGEIA,
a simulation software developed by the authors.
19We have chosen to report these markups rather than prices for clarity. Nevertheless, note that both
markups and prices illustrate identical results to the extent that the competitive price is the same regardless
of which rm sets the price and the level of contracting.
20The markups are based on the equilibria at which the non-price-setter bids at marginal costs. For the vast
majority of cases, this equilibrium generates the unique equilibrium outcome. Whenever there are multiple
equilibrium outcomes, the unreported outcomes result in higher markups.
22
No Contracts END 2,000 END 5,000 IB 6,000 IB 8,000
Price-setter IB END IB END IB END IB END IB END
Peak load 50.0 50.0 50.0 50.0 50.0 * 50.0 50.0 * 50.0
75% 11.2 15.0 11.2 *11.6 11.2 * * 15.0 * 15.0
50%  15.9 *5.2 *10.7 *5.2 *  15.9  15.9
25% 23.4 23.6 23.4 23.6 23.4 * 23.4 23.6 23.4 23.6
Table 2: The impact of forward contracts (MWs) on markups p
 pc
p in the Spanish electricity
market during 2005
Note on Table 2: The table reports the simulated mark-ups p
 pc
p for four demand levels (the years
peak load, and the 75%, 50% and 25% demand percentiles). The results are divided in columns,
depending on the identity of the price-setter. A table entry is left empty if, for the associated
demand level and contract volumes, there is not an equilibrium in which such a rm behaves as
price-setter. An asterisk denotes that the equilibrium has changed with respect to the no-contracts
case.
a price-setter; this is for instance the case when Endesa contracts 2,000 MWs and demand
is at its 75% or 50% percentiles. Second, contracts may give rise to a new equilibrium in
which Iberdrola sets a lower price; this is for instance the case when Endesa contracts either
2,000 or 5,000 MWs and demand is at its 50% percentile. Last, contracts may eliminate
certain equilibria at which Endesa sets the price; this is for instance the case when Endesa
contracts 5,000 MWs for all demand levels. Therefore, contracts by Endesa have (weakly)
pro-competitive e¤ects.
However, such conclusion is reversed when contracts are allocated to the rm with the low
prot-maximizing price, Iberdrola. More specically, contracts by Iberdrola have (weakly)
anti-competitive e¤ects when they destroy the low-price equilibrium outcomes. This is the
case when Iberdrola contracts either 6,000 or 8,000 MWs and demand is at its 75% percentile.
The e¤ects of contracts reported so far vary with the demand level, e.g. whereas at very
high or very low demand levels contracts barely have no e¤ect on equilibrium outcomes, their
e¤ect for intermediate demand levels can go in either direction depending on contract volume
and contract allocation. In real markets, since demand changes over time while contract
volumes remain xed, the overall e¤ect of contracts will depend on the relative occurrence
of periods in which contracts are either pro-competitive or anti-competitive. Therefore, with
illustrative purposes, we have assessed the e¤ect that contracts would have had on the Spanish
electricity prices during 2005 by computing total payments to producers over the year.
Table 3 reports the change in total payments when contracts are introduced. Given that
there may be multiplicity of equilibrium outcomes depending on which rm sets the price, we
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Min Max
END Contracts  Payments
1,000 MWs -84 -107
2,000 MWs -143 -194
3,000 MWs -377 -410
4,000 MWs -457 -577
5,000 MWs -439 -608
6,000 MWs -456 -632
7,000 MWs -548 -639
8,000 MWs -709 -654
Min Max
IB Contracts  Payments
1,000 MWs -24 -78
2,000 MWs -54 -161
3,000 MWs -88 -222
4,000 MWs -117 -280
5,000 MWs -181 -379
6,000 MWs -200 -434
7,000 MWs -169 -437
8,000 MWs -171 -437
Table 3: The impact of forward contracts on total payments to producers (Million e) for the
Spanish electricity market during 2005
Note on Table 3: Total payments to producers under the competitive outcome are 9,599 Me; the
minimum value under the no-contracts case is 11,422 Me, while the maximum is 11,728 Me. The
table reports how these gures change when forward contracts are introduced. Given that there
might be multiplicity of equilibrium outcomes, the Min and the Max columns report the minimum
and maximum change in total payments.
have reported the minimum and the maximum change in payments. Under all contract cases,
total payments to generators go down, thereby indicating that the pro-competitive e¤ects of
contracts seems to dominate over the anti-competitive ones. However, the anti-competitive
e¤ects can also be inferred from these gures as they account for the non-monotonic re-
lationship between payments to producers and total contract volume. For instance, such
non-monotonicity arises when Iberdrolas contracts are increased above 6,000 MWs, when
savings are reduced from 200 Me to either 169 Me or 171 Me.
7 Conclusions
In this paper we have analyzed the impact of forward contracts on the performance of spot
markets in a model that tries to capture the essential institutional and structural features
of electricity markets. Instead of assuming either Cournot or Bertrand competition, we have
tried to model the actual market rules that govern most electricity markets in practice. In
particular, we have assumed that rms compete by submitting step functions to the auction-
eer, who then sets prices and dispatches production in increasing bid order. Furthermore,
we have put no restrictions on either the market demand function - which could be either
downward-sloping or price-inelastic,- or the rmscost functions - which could result in ei-
ther constant or step-wise increasing marginal costs, and could be symmetric or asymmetric
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across rms. Thus, the model is exible enough so as to make it comparable with other
more stylized models at the same time as it allows for all degrees of complexity. Indeed,
we have used it to simulate real electricity market outcomes in order to illustrate the model
predictions.
We have found that the scope of contracts to improve market performance crucially de-
pends on both its volume and its distribution across rms. If contracts are symmetrically
distributed across symmetric rms, an increase in contracts up to rmscompetitive quanti-
ties is welfare improving. This supports the pro-competitive view of forward trading found
in previous papers. However, this prediction might be reversed when rms are asymmetric.
Indeed, contracts might lead to higher prices and reduced welfare if they jeopardize the exis-
tence of the low price equilibria. This may be the case when contracts are allocated to those
rms with weak incentives to distort prices, e.g. typically the small and/or the ine¢ cient
ones. On the contrary, contracts are welfare improving whenever they are allocated to large
and e¢ cient rms with strong incentives to raise prices. These results suggest that the pol-
icy debate should focus on how allocate forward contract obligations rather than on their
desirability per se.
We have focused on exogenously given contracts since we believe, in line with Bushnell et
al. (2007), that many "vertical arrangements [in electricity markets] are better understood
and can reasonably be considered to be exogenous." Furthermore, without knowledge of
how exogenously given contracts a¤ect market performance, it would be di¢ cult to inform
policy-makers on how to design forward contract obligations, e.g. how much virtual power
to auction-o¤ and to whom. Still, a further step of the analysis would be to allow for more
general types of contracts by investigating the incentives to sign new contracts and hence
their endogenous distribution across rms.21 The current paper provides the needed rst step
to perform such an analysis.
To conclude, even though our analysis has been inspired by the workings of electricity
markets, we believe that its implications have broader applicability. Since the most relevant
features of our model are not unique to electricity markets, its conclusions could be applied
to other contexts. Indeed, many modern markets are organized around a centralized auction
site where all transactions are executed at market prices, e.g. order driven periodic auctions
in nancial markets, auctions for on-line services, or markets for inputs such as gas.
21Our paper also abstracts from other types of dynamic e¤ects. For instance Newbery (1998) shows that
if potential entrants can sign contracts, the market becomes contestable. On the contrary, conventional
wisdom suggests that contract positions may also protect an incumbent from the adverse e¤ect of a reduction
in the spot price and could therefore be used to deter new entry. Bushnell and Ishii (2007) show that just as
contracts change rmsincentives in the spot market, so do they inuence investment decisions and thus, long
run market performance. Last, Schultz (2005) shows that if contracts are negotiated in a sequential manner,
rms may have an incentives to raise spot market prices in order to inuence the buyerss willingness to pay
for those contracts.
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Appendix
Notation
The following pieces of notation are used throughout the Appendix. We will denote by xi
the maximum quantity that rm i can produce at marginal costs strictly below the marginal
costs of producing its contract quantity, ci(xi); and by xi the maximum quantity that rm i
can produce with marginal costs not exceeding ci(xi): Note that xi 2 [xi; xi] : Formally,
xi  max fq : q 2 [0; Ki] and ci (q)  ci (xi)g ; and
xi  max fq : q 2 [0; Ki] and ci (q) < ci (xi)g ;
Similarly, we will denote by si(p) the maximum quantity that rm i can produce at marginal
costs strictly below p; and by si(p) the maximum quantity that rm i can produce with
marginal costs not exceeding p: Formally,
si(p) = max fq : q 2 [0; Ki] and ci (q) < pg ; and
si(p) = max fq : q 2 [0; Ki] and ci (q)  pg :
Last, note that the market clearing price p depends on the bid proles, and that the
quantity allocated to each rm will depend on both p and b: Nevertheless to simplify no-
tation, in the proofs that follow we will suppress these arguments whenever clear from the
context.
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A Proofs
Lemma A.1. For rm i; it is weakly dominated (i) to bid below marginal costs for quantities
such that ci (q) > ci (xi), as well as (ii) to bid above marginal costs for quantities such that
ci (q) < ci (xi) :
Proof of Lemma A.1. (i) Let us x the bid functions submitted by rms other than i at
b i (q) ; and compare the prots made by rm i with the strategies b0i (q) and bbi (q) which only
di¤er in the bids for units above xi: Whereas under b0i (q) those units are bid in at marginal
costs, under bbi they are bid in at prices below marginal costs. More precisely,
b0i (q) =
(
bi (q) if q  xi
ci (q) if q > xi
and bbi (q) = ( bi (q) if q  xiebi (q) 2 [bi (xi) ; ci(q)) if q > xi:
Letbb (respectively, b0) denote the bidding prole (bbi (q) ; b i (q)) (respectively, (b0i (q) ; b i (q))).
We rst note that the equilibrium price under bb is no larger than under b0 as bbi (q)  b0i (q)
while b i (q) coincides under both proles. Consequently bp  p0: Furthermore, if bp < p0 thenbqi  q0i and q0i  xi  xi as bbi (q) = b0i (q) for all q  xi: Prots at the two proles are given
by
i (b
0) = [q0i   xi] p0   Ci (q0i) +  ixi and
i
bb = [bqi   xi] bp  Ci (bqi) +  ixi;
with bqi  q0i  xi  xi. Consequently,
i (b
0) = i
bb+ [q0i   xi] [p0   bp]| {z }
0
 
Z bqi
q0i
[bp  ci(q)]| {z }
0
dq  i
bb
where
R bqi
q0i
[bp  ci(q)] dq  0 as either bqi = q0i so that the integral is zero or q0i < bqi and thenbp  ci(q) for all q > xi and hence for q 2 [q0i; bqi] : Since prots under b0 are no smaller than
under bb, the statement follows.
(ii) Let us x the bid functions submitted by rms other than i at b i (q) ; and compare
the prots made by rm i with the strategies b0i (q) and bbi (q) that only di¤er in the bids for
units below x; with
b0i (q) =
(
ci (q) if q  xi
bi (q) if q > xi
and bbi (q) = ( ebi (q) 2 (ci(q); ci (xi)] if q  xi
bi (q) if q > xi:
We rst note that the equilibrium price under bb is no smaller than under b0 as bbi (q)  b0i (q)
while b i (q) coincide under both proles. Consequently bp  p0: Furthermore, if bp > p0 thenbqi  q0i and q0i  xi  xi as bbi (q) = b0i (q) for all q > xi: The di¤erence in prots at the two
proles is hence
i (b
0) = i
bb  [q^i   xi] [bp  p0]| {z }
0
+
Z q0i
q^i
[p0   ci(q)]| {z }
0
dq  i
bb :
29
Since prots under b0 are no smaller than under bb, the statement follows.
Proof of Proposition 1. Since we have to show that qj 2

sj(p
); sj(p)

, we rst prove
that qj  sj (p) : Assume for the sake of contradiction that there is some rm j; j 6= i; for
which qj < sj(p
) with qj  xj as weakly dominated strategies are not allowed: As there is a
nite number of units, there exists ^ > 0 such that no unit has been bid in at prices in the
interval (p   ^; p) : Pick an  < ^ and consider the following deviation by rm j :
b0j (q) =
8><>:
bj (q) for 0  q < qj
p    for q 2 qj; sj (p)
bj (q) for sj (p
) < q  Kj

Let the resulting bidding prole be denoted by b0; where b0 = (b1(q); ::; b0j(q); ::; bN(q)); with
associated equilibrium price p0 and with q0j = qj (b
0)  qj. The di¤erence between rm js
prots under b and b0 is given by:
j (b
0)  j (b) = [p0   p]

q0j   xj

+
Z q0j
qj
[p   cj(q)] dq:
There are two cases to consider: (a) If p0 = p , then the di¤erence in prots is positive:
the second term of the above equation is positive by the denition of sj (p
) as p > cj(q) for
any positive q < q0j  sj (p) ; whereas the rst term can be made arbitrarily small by taking
 small enough. (b) If p0 = p; the deviant now sells the additional output
 
qj   sj (p)

at a
price above its marginal costs and thus gets more prots. The derived contradictions prove
the rst result.
We now show that qj  sj(p):By contradiction, assume there is some rm j; j 6= i;
for which qj > sj(p): By elimination of weakly dominated strategies, this requires qj  xj:
Consider the following deviation by rm j :
b0j (q) =
8><>:
bj (q) for 0  q < sj (p)
p +  for q 2 [sj (p) ; qj]
bj (q) for qj < q  Kj

Let the resulting prole be denoted by b0; with equilibrium price p0 and with q0j = qj (b
0)  qj:
The di¤erence between rm js prots under b and b0 is given by:
j (b
0)  j (b) = [p0   p]

q0j   xj

+
Z qj
q0j
[cj(q)  p] dq:
There are two cases to consider: (a) If p0 = p+, then the di¤erence in prots is positive:
the second term of the above equation is positive given that cj(q) > p for any positive
q > q0j  sj (p) ; whereas the rst term can be made arbitrarily small by taking  small
enough. (b) If p0 = p; the deviant now reduces its output by (qj   sj (p)) and therefore
reduces its losses. As in either case, the deviation is protable we ran into a contradiction
that proves the second result.
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Proof of Lemma 1. (i) We rst note that qj  sj(p) holds for all j 6= i because
of Proposition 1: Thus if p  pc; then sj (p)  sj (pc) given that sj in a non-decreasing
function of p: Consequently, NPSj (p
) = maxq fp [q   xj]  Cj (q)g +  jxj is an increasing
function of p as qNPSj (p
)  qcj > xj: Finally, if qcj = xj; rms is prots are increasing in p
if qj > qcj ; and they are independent of p
 if qj = qcj :
(ii) Since qNPSj (p
)  qcj if p  pc; then, using similar arguments to those above,
qNPSj (p
)  qcj  xj implies that NPSj (p) is a decreasing function of p if qcj < xj and
it is non-increasing if qcj = xj:
Proof of Lemma 2. If p  pc then qPSi (p) = D(p) 
P
j q
NPS
j (p
) = D(p) Pj 6=i sj(p):
Since D(p) Pi si(p) then qPSi (p)  si (p) ; so that the result follows as
PSi (p
) = p

qPSi (p
)  xi
  C  qPSi (p)+  ixi
 p [si (p)  xi]  C (si (p)) +  ixi = NPSi (p) :
If p < pc then qPSi (p
) > si (p) and
PSi (p
) = NPSi (p
) +
Z qPSi (p)
si(p)
[p   ci(q)] dq < NPSi (p) ;
as p < ci(q) for all q > si (p) :
Proof of Proposition 2. (i) We rst show that xi < qci implies p
  pc: Argue by
contradiction and assume xi < qci and p
 < pc where p = pi (b i) : Since p
 < pc, then
by appealing to Proposition 1 it must hold that qNPSj (p
)  qcj ; so that qPSi (p)  qci and
hence qPSi (p
)  xi: As there is a nite number of units, there exists ^ > 0 such that no unit
has been bid in at prices in the interval (p; p + ^) : Pick an  < ^ such that p +  < pc
and suppose that rm i deviates from setting the price at p to p + : We argue that this
deviation increases rm is prots, contradicting equilibrium behaviour, i.e., contradicting
p = pi (b i). To see this, note that the di¤erence in prots is given by
PSi (p
 + )  PSi (p) =  [q0i   xi] +
Z qi
q0i
[ci (q)  p] dq;
where q0i = qi (p
 + )  qi = qi (p) :
There are two cases to consider: (a) If q0i = qi; then the di¤erence in prots,  [q
0
i   xi] ; is
positive given that q0i = qi  qci > xi. (b) If q0i < qi; then it must be still the case that q0i > qci
as p +  < pc and no other unit is bid in at (p; p + ^) : Consequently  [q0i   xi] > 0 andR qi
q0i
[ci (q)  p] dq > 0 as p < pc  ci (q) for any q > qci . As the rm is better-o¤ deviating,a
contradiction is reached.
Second, we show that xi < qci implies xi  qi: Argue by contradiction and assume xi 
qci and xi > qi: Since xi  qci then p  pc by the proof above. Lets rst assume p > pc: As
the rivals are dispatching all units with marginal costs below p, then qi  qci and p > ci (qi) :
Consider the following deviation by rm i: all units that were originally bid in at p plus the
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extra units needed to cover qci are bid in at p
   ; where again  < ^; and p    > pc; the
remaining units are bid in as originally. Since the equilibrium price is now p    > pc rm i
produces qci  q0i = qi(p   ; b j)  qi(p; b j) = qi: Firm is deviation gains are given by
PSi (p
   )  PSi (p) =  [xi   qi] +
Z q0i
qi
[p     ci (q)] dq > 0;
where the last inequality follows from the fact that xi > qi and p    > pc  ci(q) for all
q  q0i as q0i  qci : The existence of a protable deviation gives the desired contradiction.
Last, lets assume p = pc: As this implies qi = qci ; xi  qci and xi > qi would contradict
each other.
(ii) If xi = qci and p
 = pc; which trivially imply xi = qi; rm i has no incentives to deviate.
If rm i reduced the price to p0 < p = pc; its prots would decrease by
R q0i
qi
[p0   ci (q)] dq < 0;
given that p0 < p = pc  ci (q) for all q > qi = qci : If it increased the price to p0 > p = pc;
its prots would decrease by
R qi
q0i
[ci (q)  p0] dq < 0; given that p0 > p = pc  ci (q) for all
q < qi = q
c
i :
(iii) The proof follows the same steps and (reversed) arguments as the one in part (i); it
is hence omitted.
Proof of Theorem 1. (i) [Only if] Suppose there exists a pure-strategy equilibrium
(b1; ::; bn) in which rm i sets the price at p  pc and rmspayo¤s are PSi (p) and NPSj (p);
i; j = 1; :::N; j 6= i: If this is the case then Condition 1). follows from Propositions 1 and 2,
and both Conditions 2). and 3). follow trivially from the denition of Nash equilibrium.
[If ] We have to show that no rm prots by deviating from strategies that satisfy con-
ditions 1). to 3). Consider rst the non-price-setters j; j 6= i: By 1). we only need to
consider deviations that imply a change in identity. Let us distinguish between those rms
with xj > qj and those with xj  qj: For a rm j with xj > qj the only relevant deviations
are those that allow to become the price-setter at a price below p: To see this, compare for
any p0  p;
NPSj (p
) = p [qj   xj]  C(qj) +  jxj with
PSj (p
0) = p0

q0j   xj
  C(q0j) +  jxj,
where qj = qNPSj (p
)  q0j = qj (p0). The di¤erence in prots is given by
PSj (p
0)  NPSj (p) = [p0   p]

q0j   xj

+
Z qj
q0j
[cj (q)  p] dq: (4)
The rst term of the above expression is negative given that p0 > p and q0j  qj < xj:
The second term is also negative given that p  cj (qj)  cj
 
q0j

; where the rst inequality
follows from Proposition 1. Hence, those rms j with xj > qj and pj (b j)  p will not
deviate. To assess whether rms j with xj > qj have incentives to deviate by reducing the
price, note that for any p0 < p the di¤erence in prots becomes,
PSj (p
0)  NPSj (p) = [p0   p]

q0j   xj

+
Z q0j
qj
[p   cj (q)] dq; (5)
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where now qj  q0j: The second term of the above expression is negative given that p  pc and
Proposition 1 imply p < cj (q) for all q > qj: The rst term is also negative if xj < q0j: Since
deviating to pj is the most protable deviation, it follows that rms with p

j (b j) < p
 and
xj  qj
 
pj

will not deviate. Finally, since 3). ensures that rms j with pj (b j) < p
 and
xj > qj
 
pj

do not want to become the price-setter either, one can conclude that no deviation
by rms j with xj > qj is protable.
Consider now rms j such that xj  qj: The only relevant deviations are those that allow
to become the price-setter at a price pj > p
. Deviating to a price lower than p is not
protable given that xj  qj  q0j implies that the rst term in (5) is negative. Hence, those
rms j with xj  qj and pj (b j)  p will not deviate. Those rms j with xj  qj and
pj (b j) > p
 will not deviate if xj  qj
 
pj

given that (4) would then be negative. Last,
since by 3). rms j with pj (b j) > p
 and xj < qj
 
pj

do not want to become the price-setter
either, no deviation by the non-price-setters is protable.
Consider now rm i: Since Condition 1 holds, the only deviations we have to consider
are those that would allow rm i to become a non-price-setter at a price below pi : Since this
deviation is ruled out by Condition 2, we can conclude that the strategy prole (b1; ::; bn)
constitutes a Nash equilibrium.
(ii) The proof follows the same steps and (reversed) arguments as the one in part (i); it
is hence omitted.
Proof of Proposition 3. (i) We rst note that the set of su¢ cient conditions for a strategy
prole to constitute a Nash equilibrium follow from Theorem 1 part (i). Condition 2). of the
Theorem, i.e., PSi (p
)  NPSi (p) for all p < p such that qNPSi (p) +
P
j 6=i qj(p; b) = D(p);
holds trivially as the only price at which rm i can be a non-price-setter is pc and this deviation
is ruled out by the fact that p = pi is a maximizer, i.e., 
PS
i (p
)  PSi (pc) = NPSi (pc) as
rivals are bidding at marginal costs. Condition 3). also holds: xi  qci (which by Proposition
2 implies p  pc) and qj = qNPSj (p)  qcj ; rule out deviations by the non-price-setters
to lower prices as Lemmas 1 and 2 imply NPSj (p
)  NPSj (p)  PSj (p) for any p  p
given that xj  qcj for all rms j: Hence, we only need to show that an equilibrium exists
with p = pi  pc at which rm i is the price-setter and prots are given by PSi (p) and
NPSj (p
) for all j 6= i: We prove this by constructing a strategy prole that results in such
an equilibrium. Consider the strategy prole b according to which all rms but rm i bid at
marginal costs and rm i submits the strategy bi (q; pi ) where
bi (q; p

i ) =
(
ci (q) if q < xi;
max fpi ; ci (q)g if q  xi:
We rst note that the equilibrium price under the proposed prole, p, must be equal to pi :
The proposed prole cannot result in p > pi since at any such price p
 all rms are bidding
at marginal costs, and p > pi  pc; a contradiction. The proposed prole cannot result in
p < pi either as at any such price, qi = xi; implying that rm is prots would be negative,
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which contradicts that pi maximizes rm i s prots as 
PS
i (p

i )  PSi (pc)  0 given that
xi  qci :
Last, we need to show that rms are best responding to each other. Under prole b; rm
i cannot protably deviate since p = pi (c i) implies that it is already maximizing over its
residual demand. For rms j; j 6= i, any protable deviation must result in the deviant rm
becoming the price-setter. Such a deviation can only be protable by rms j with pj > p

i
as by appealing to lemmas 1 and 2 we have that
NPSj (p

i )  NPSj (p)  PSj (p) for any p  pi :
For prices above pi rm i is bidding at marginal costs, so that if rm j with p

j > p

i
deviates it will set the price at pj (c j). Since 
NPS
j (p
)  PSj (pj) holds for all j 6= i such
that pj (c j) > p
; such deviations are not protable either. As rms are best responding to
each other, the proposed prole b constitutes an equilibrium as claimed.
(ii) The proof follows the same steps and (reversed) arguments as the one in part (i); hence,
we only provide here the pieces of information which are specic to this case. In particular, a
strategy prole that results in such an equilibrium is a strategy prole b according to which
all rms but rm i bid at marginal costs and rm i submits the strategy bi(q; pi ); where
bi

q; p
i

=
(
min
n
p
i
; ci (q)
o
if q  xi;
ci (q) if q > xi:
Proof of Proposition 4.
Consider the case in which xi  qci for all rms. First, suppose there exist at least two
equilibria: one in which rm i sets the price at p and all other rms bid at marginal costs and
another one in which rm i sets the price at p0 and at least one rm j; j 6= i; bids some units
above marginal costs, b0j (q) > cj (q). Let the bid proles submitted by the non-price-setters
under both equilibria be respectively denoted b i and b0 i. Three cases may arise:
(a) Equilibrium prices under both proles are equal, p0 = p; so that both equilibria are
outcome-equivalent.
(b) Equilibrium prices di¤er, with p0 < p:
Note that b0 i (q)  b i (q) implies that qi
 
p; b0 i
  qi (p; b i) for any p: By revealed
preference,
PSi (p
; b i) > PSi (p
0; b i) and PSi
 
p; b0 i

< PSi
 
p0; b0 i

implying
p [qi (p; b i)  xi]  Ci (qi (p; b i)) > p0 [qi (p0; b i)  xi]  Ci (qi (p0; b i)) and
p

qi
 
p; b0 i
  xi  Ci  qi  p; b0 i < p0 qi  p0; b0 i  xi  Ci  qi  p0; b0 i :
Rearranging terms, Z qi(p;b0 i)
qi(p;b i)
[p   ci(q)] dq <
Z qi(p0;b0 i)
qi(p0;b i)
[p0   ci(q)] dq: (6)
34
Since p0 < p and marginal cost functions are non-decreasing, we must have
qi
 
p; b0 i
  qi (p; b i) < qi  p0; b0 i  qi (p0; b i) :
Furthermore, since at least one non-price-setter is bidding above marginal costs under b0; then
qi
 
p; b0 i
  qi (p; b i). Consequently, qi  p0; b0 i > qi (p0; b i) :As this impliesPj 6=i qj  p0; b0 j <P
j 6=i qj (p
0; b j) ; at least one non-price-setter must have unit(s) with marginal costs below
p0 which are not dispatched under b0; so that Proposition 1 is violated, a contradiction with
equilibrium behaviour.
(c) Equilibrium prices di¤er, with p0 > p:
Again, qi
 
p0; b0 i
  qi (p0; b i) : By revealed preference, equation (6) applies. Thus, if
qi (p
0; b i) = qi
 
p0; b0 i

then the left hand side of (6) must be negative, which contradicts
Proposition 2, i.e., that p is an optimal price for rm i when the rivals bid at b i, so that
qi
 
p0; b0 i

> qi (p
0; b i) must hold. As this implies
P
j 6=i qj
 
p0; b0 j

<
P
j 6=i qj (p
0; b j) ; a non-
price-setter must have unit(s) with marginal costs below p0 which are not dispatched under
b0; violating Proposition 1 and hence contradicting equilibrium behaviour.
Last, suppose there exist at least two equilibria: one in which rm i sets the price at p
and all other rms bid at marginal costs; and another one in which rm i sets the price at p0
and at least some rm j; j 6= i; bids some units below marginal costs, b0j (q) < cj (q). Again,
let the bid proles submitted by the non-price-setters under both equilibria be respectively
denoted b i and b0 i: Since xi  qci for all rms, then p  pc and xj  qj so that, by revealed
preference arguments, rm j may only bid below marginal costs those units that are already
dispatched under the rst equilibria. Hence, qi
 
p; b0 i

= qi (p
; b i) : As this implies that
rm i must still nd it optimal to set the price at p when all other rms bid at b0 i, then
p = p0 and both equilibria must be outcome equivalent. This shows our claim.
Proof of Corollary 3. (i) Suppose xi  qci for all rms i = 1; :::; N: First, assume
that the equilibrium in which rm k is the price-setter exists. From Proposition 3 part (i)
NPSr (p

k)  PSr (pr) must hold for all rms r < k: Since by Lemma 1 the non-price-setters
prots are increasing in p; it follows that NPSr
 
pk i
  NPSr (pr) for any i = 1; ::; k   1:
Consequently, NPSr
 
pk i
  NPSr (pr)  NPSr (pk)  PSr (pr) implies that the equilibria
in which rms f1; :::; k   1g are the price-setters also exist:
Last, assume that the equilibrium in which rm k is the price-setter does not exist. Since
rms j > k do not have any protable deviation, it must be the case that for some rm r < k,
NPSr (p

k) < 
PS
r (p

r) : Since the non-price-settersprots are increasing in p; it follows that
NPSr
 
pk+i
  NPSr (pk) for any i = 1; ::; N   k: Consequently, NPSr  pk+i  NPSr (pk) <
PSr (p

r) implies that the equilibria in which rms fk + 1; :::; Ng are the price-setters do not
exist either:
(ii) Suppose xi  qci for all rms. It su¢ ces to reverse the direction of the inequalities
with respect to the ones above.
Proof of Proposition 5. Existence of an equilibrium can be guaranteed by appealing
to Renys better reply security (see Corollary 5.2 to Theorem 3.1 in Reny (1999)): due
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to the e¢ cient tie-breaking rule, bidderspayo¤s are secure and their sum is upper semi-
continuous, so that an equilibrium always exists. Note further that existence of a pure-
strategy equilibrium follows from Corollary 14 to Theorem 6 in Jackson and Swinkels (2005)
as the multi-unit uniform-price auction analyzed here satises assumption 8in their paper
(see page 122).
To see why marginal cost bidding by the non-price-setters may not generate an equilib-
rium, consider the following example. A duopoly composed of rms 1 and 2 face demand
D(p) = 20   p. Both rmsproduction units have capacity normalized to one, and their
marginal costs are given by
c1(q) =
(
4 if 0  q  4
dqe if 4  q  20 and c2(q) =
8><>:
dqe
2
if 0  q  11
11
2
if 11  q  16
dqe
2
if 16  q  20

Finally, let their contract positions be x1 = 0 and x2 = 15. If rm 1 acts as the price-setter,
then p1 = 5:5; D (p

1) = 14:5; q2 = 10 and 
NPS
2 (p

1) =  55: However, rm 2 prefers to
deviate and set the price at 5:25: It would then sell 14:75 units (since x1 = 0; rm 1 is not
o¤ering any unit below 5:5) and would make prots equal to  54:938: Since the deviation
is protable, the candidate price p1 = 5:5 fails to be in equilibrium. If rm 2 acts as the
price-setter, then p2 = 4; D (p

2) = 16; q1 = 4 and 
NPS
1 (p

2) = 0: However, rm 1 prefers
to deviate and set the price at 4:5: It would then sell 0:5 units (rm 2 is bidding x2 = 15
units at prices no larger than 4) and it would make prots equal to 0:25: Since the deviation
is protable, the candidate price p2 = 4 fails to be in equilibrium.
22 Nevertheless, for this
market conguration it is an equilibrium for rm 2 to set the price by biddingmin f4:5; c2 (q)g
for q  15 and marginal costs for the remaining units, while rm 1 follows a at strategy at
4:5, i.e., b1(q) = max(4:5; c1(q)). This equilibrium results in p = 4:5:
Proof of Proposition 6. We prove parts (i) and (ii) together. For xi  xj = 0; let us rst
dene
x0i  min

xi : xi 2 [0; qci ] and NPSj (pi (xi)) < PSj
 
pj (0)
	
where we have written pi (xi) to denote rm is prot-maximizing price when it holds con-
tracts xi (we are implicitly assuming that rm j bids at marginal costs, which by Proposition
4 is w.l.o.g.). In words, x0i is the smallest amount of contracts held by rm i for which the
equilibrium in which rm i sets the price does not exist.
First, suppose that all contracts are allocated to rm 1. By Corollary 2, p1 (0) is an equi-
librium price, while p1 (q
c
1) = p
c is not given that p2 (0) > p
c. Furthermore, since NPS1 (p
)
is increasing in p for x1 2 (0; qc1) (Lemma 1) and p1 (x1) is non-increasing in x1; existence of
x01 2 (0; qc1) is guaranteed. Furthermore, since Corollary 2 guarantees equilibrium existence,
22Note that non-existence of the equilibrium at which the non-price setter bids at marginal cost is the
exception rather than the rule. In the example discussed above, if x2  14:5; then p1 = 5:5 is an equilibrium.
Similarly, if x2 > 15; then p2 = 4 is an equilibrium.
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p2(0) must be an equilibrium price for x1 2 [x01; qc1]. Hence, there must also exist x001 2 [0; x01)
such that the equilibrium prices are p1(x1)  p1(0) for all x1 2 [0; x001] ; p1(x1) < p1(0) and
p2 (0) for all x1 2 (x001; x01) ; and p2 (0) < p1 (0) for all x1 2 [x01; qc1]. Hence, contracts by rm
1 result in (weakly) lower prices as compared to the no-contracts case. Moreover, since by
Corollary 2 the highest price equilibrium always exists, it follows that p2(0) > p

1(x
0
1). This
yields a (weak) non-monotonic relationship between contract volume and equilibrium prices
when contracts are allocated to rm 1.
Last, suppose that all contracts are allocated to rm 2. If p2 (0) is not an equilibrium
price at the no-contracts case, then x02 = 0: Otherwise, existence of x
0
2 2 (0; qc2) is again
guaranteed by monotonicity since p2 (0) is an equilibrium price while p

2 (q
c
2) = p
c < p1 (0) is
not, NPS2 (p
) is increasing in p for x2 2 (0; qc2) (Lemma 1) and p2 (x2) is non-increasing in x2:
Thus, allocating contracts x2 2 (0; x02) to rm 2 leads to (weakly) lower prices as compared
to the no-contracts case, as equilibrium prices are p2 (x2) < p

2 (0) and p

1 (0). However,
allocating contracts x2 2 [x02; qc2] yields (weakly) higher prices, as the unique equilibrium
price is p1 (0) > p

2 (0) : This also shows that there is a (weak) non-monotonic relationship
between contract volume and equilibrium prices when contracts are allocated to rm 2.
B Details on Simulations
The Spanish electricity market is organized similarly to many other wholesale electricity
markets around the world. In particular, most transactions take place through an organized
exchange, that operates on an hourly basis according to the rules described in Section 2 (see
Crampes and Fabra (2005) for more details). The market structure is highly concentrated,
with the two largest rms - Endesa and Iberdrola - controlling almost 60% of total thermal
capacity, more than 80% of total hydro capacity, and approximately 40% of total renewables.
Even though the shares of these technologies on total production vary across years, in 2005
hydro and renewables contributed to cover 8% and 11% of total demand, respectively. Table
4 summarizes the market structure of the main generators in the Spanish electricity market.
In order to conduct the simulations, we have rst computed rmsmarginal cost curves
following similar techniques as in previous papers (Fabra and Toro (2005)).23 In particular,
we have estimated each thermal units marginal production costs on a daily basis, taking
into account the type of fuel it burns, the cost of the fuel, the plants heat rate (i.e., the
e¢ ciency rate at which each plant converts the heat content of the fuel into output), the
short-run variable cost of operating and maintaining it, and the costs of its CO2 emissions.
In addition, for coal plants, we have added an estimate of the costs of transporting coal
from the nearest harbor where it is delivered to the plant where it is consumed. Lastly, each
units generation capacity has been reduced by its estimated outage rate. By aggregating the
23The data used in the simulations have been obtained from various sources, including The National Energy
Commission (CNE), Red Eléctrica de España (REE), OMEL and UNESA.
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Firm/ Technology Nuclear Coal CCGT Oil-Gas Total Shares
Endesa 3,511 5,511 1,170 1,779 10,918 33%
Iberdrola 3,222 1,225 3,704 3,050 8,456 26%
Unión Fenosa 702 1,946 1,559 747 4,954 15%
Gas Natural   2,729  2,729 8%
Hidrocantábrico 155 1,549 390  2,094 6%
Others  909 2,144 731 3,784 11%
Table 4: Installed Thermal Capacity (MW) by Firm and Technology in the Spanish Electricity
Market, 2005 (Source: REE)
capacities of each rms thermal units in increasing marginal cost order, we have obtained
estimates of rmsthermal marginal cost curves for each day of the year.
Furthermore, we have assumed that the marginal costs of producing electricity with hydro
and renewables equal zero. The production coming from such sources has therefore been
added to the left of each rms thermal marginal costs curve in order to construct their overall
marginal costs curves. We have chosen not to use actual data on hydro production, as it is
already the result of rmsstrategic decisions. Instead, poundage hydro generation has been
set to peak-shave demand on a monthly basis, taking into account maximum hydro ows.24
Both run-of-river hydro as well as renewablesproduction have been uniformly spread across
time. Hydro stocks, run-of-river hydro ows and renewable energy are monthly estimates of
a representative year.
Demand has been assumed to be price-inelastic at the actual hourly demand levels that
were observed in 2005. Furthermore, we have set the price cap at 120e/MWh, below its
explicit 180e/MWh level, with the aim of reecting issues such as the threat of entry or
regulatory intervention. Nevertheless, setting the price at either 120 or 180e/MWh does not
change the qualitative nature of the results.
24As it is by now well understood (Bushnell (2003)), rms could strategically shift hydro from peak to
o¤-peak hours, thereby distorting the e¢ cient use of hydro resources. A full analysis of this issue is out of
the scope of this section. However, despite assuming competitive bidding for hydro units, hydro still a¤ects
rmsstrategic decisions through its impact on their inframarginal output.
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